

**Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.  
BC-FNA (Bouncy Castle FIPS .NET API)  
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy  
Version: 1.0.1 Date: 10/31/16**



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### 1 Introduction

This document defines the Security Policy for the Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. FIPS .NET (BC-FNA) Module, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a cryptographic library. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 1 requirements. The SW version is 1.0.1.

The cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environment on the general purpose computer (GPC) platforms detailed in Table 1.

**Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Tested Environments**

<b><u>Operational Environments</u></b>			
<b><u>Hardware Platform</u></b>	<b><u>Operating System</u></b>	<b><u>.NET Framework Version</u></b>	<b><u>CLR Version</u></b>
Lenovo Flex 3	Windows 10 Enterprise (64 bit)	.NET 4.6.1	CLR 4
Asus T100HA	Windows 10 Professional (64 bit)	.NET 4.6.1	CLR 4
HP Zbook 14 G2	Windows 8.1 Professional (32 bit)	.NET 4.5.2	CLR 4
HP Zbook 14 G2	Windows 7 SP1 (32 bit)	.NET 4.5.2	CLR 4

As per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5, the cryptographic module will remain compliant with the FIPS 140-2 validation when operating on any general purpose computer

(GPC) provided that the GPC uses the specified single-user platform, or another compatible single-user platform such as one of the .NET Runtime Environments listed on any of the following:

- Windows 7 with .NET 4.6.1
- Windows 8 with .NET 4.6.1
- Windows 8.1 with .NET 4.6.1
- Windows Server 2012 R2 with .NET 4.6.1
- Windows Vista with .NET 4.5.2
- Windows 8 with .NET 4.5.2
- Windows Server 2012 R2 with .NET 4.5.2
- Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 with .NET 4.5.2

Compliance is maintained for other versions of the respective operational environments where the Module binary is unchanged. No claim can be made as to the correct operation of the Module or the security strengths of the generated keys if any source code is changed and the module binary is reconstructed.

*For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby stated that the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.*

The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require a FIPS 140-2 validated Cryptographic Library. The Module is a software-only embodiment; the cryptographic boundary is the Windows Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file, *bc-fips-1.0.1.dll*.

The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are given in Table 2 as follows:

**Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements**

Security Requirement	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1

Security Requirement	Security Level
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of Other Attacks	1


## 1.1

### 1.1.1 Logical Cryptographic Boundary

The executable for the BC-FNA Module is: *bc-fips-1.0.1.dll*. This module is the only software component within the Logical Cryptographic Boundary and the only software component that carries out cryptographic functions covered by FIPS 140-2. Figure 1 shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software and hardware components of the computer. The BC classes are executed on the .NET Framework Common Language Runtime (CLR) using the classes of the Framework Class Library (FCL) . The CLR is the interface to the computer's Operating System (OS) that is the interface to the various physical components of the computer.


The physical components of the computer are discussed further in Section 6. Abbreviations introduced in Figure 1 that describe physical components are: Central Processing Unit (CPU), Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) and Input Output (I/O).

Figure 1 – Block Diagram of the Software for the BC-FNA Module.



### 1.1.2 Physical Boundary

The BC-FNA Module runs on a General Purpose Computer (GPC). The Physical Cryptographic Boundary for the module is the case of that computer. Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the physical components of a typical GPC and the ports or interfaces across the Physical Cryptographic Boundary. All the physical components are standard electronic components; there are not any custom integrated circuits or components dedicated to FIPS 140-2 related functions.



Abbreviations introduced in Figure 2 are: Basic I/O System (BIOS), Integrated Device Electronics (IDE), Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI), Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) and Universal Serial Bus (USB). Input or output ports are designated by arrows with single heads, while I/O ports are indicated by bidirectional arrows.

**Figure 2 – Block Diagram of the Physical Components of a typical GPC.**

For FIPS 140-2 purposes, the BC-FNA Module is defined as a “multi-chip standalone module”, therefore, the module’s physical ports or interfaces are defined as those for the hardware of the GPC. These physical ports are separated into the logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as shown in Table 3.

The BC-FNA module is a software module only, and, therefore, control of the physical ports is outside of the module's scope. The module does provides a set of logical interfaces which are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. When the module performs self-tests or is in an error state, the module prevents all output on the logical data output interface. Activities in the module are single-threaded, and when in an error state, the module does not return any output data, only an error value.

The mapping of the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces to the module is described in table 3.

**Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces**

Interface	Module Equivalent
Data Input	API input parameters – plaintext and/or ciphertext data.
Data Output	API output parameters and return values – plaintext and/or ciphertext data.
Control Input	API method calls – method calls, or input parameters, that specify commands and/or control data used to control the operation of the module.
Status Output	API output parameters and return/error codes that provide status information used to indicate the state of the module.
Power	Start up/Shutdown of a process containing the module.

## 1.2 Modes of Operation

There will be two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in FIPS-approved mode when the appropriate factory is called. To verify that a module is in the Approved Mode of operation, the user can call a FIPS status method (*CryptoServicesRegistrar.IsInApprovedOnlyMode()*). If the module is configured to allow approved and non-approved mode operation, a call to *CryptoServicesRegistrar.setApprovedMode(true)* will switch the current thread of user control into approved mode.

In FIPS-approved mode, the module will not provide non-approved algorithms, therefore, exceptions will be called if the user tries to access non-approved algorithms in the Approved Mode.



## 2 Cryptographic Functionality

The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in Table 4 to Table 6, below.

**Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions**

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
AES	[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, and Addendum to SP 800-38A (Oct 2010) ] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB128, CTR, CBC-CS1, CBC-CS2, CBC-CS3 Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits	4015
CCM	[SP 800-38C] Functions: Generation, Authentication Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits	4015
CMAC	[SP 800-38B] Functions: Generation, Authentication Key sizes: AES with 128, 192, 256 bits and Triple-DES with 2-key <sup>1, 2</sup> , 3-key	4015 (AES), 2199 (Triple-DES)
DRBG	[SP 800-90A] Functions: Hash DRBG, HMAC DRBG, CTR DRBG Security Strengths: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits	1194
DSA <sup>3</sup>	[FIPS 186-4] Functions: PQG Generation, PQG Verification, Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification Key sizes: 1024, 2048, 3072 bits (1024 only for SigVer)	1087

<sup>1</sup> 2<sup>20</sup> block limit enforced by module.

<sup>2</sup> In approved mode of operation, the use of 2-key Triple-DES to generate MACs for anything other than verification purposes is non-compliant.

<sup>3</sup> DSA signature generation with SHA-1 is only for use with protocols.

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
ECDSA	[FIPS 186-4] Functions: Signature Generation Component, Public Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification, Public Key Validation Curves/Key sizes: P-192 <sup>4</sup> , P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163 <sup>4</sup> , K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-163 <sup>4</sup> , B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571	894, 839 (CVL)
GCM/GMAC <sup>5</sup>	[SP 800-38D] Functions: Generation, Authentication Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits	4015
HMAC	[FIPS 198-1] Functions: Generation, Authentication SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256	2618
KAS <sup>6</sup>	[SP 800-56A] without key confirmation. Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE	89
KAS Component	[All of SP 800-56A EXCEPT KDF] Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE [SP 800-56A Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH Primitive] Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE	875
KDF, Existing Application-Specific <sup>7</sup>	[SP 800-135] Functions: TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, X9.63 KDF.	837 (CVL)
Key Wrapping Using Block Ciphers <sup>8</sup>	[SP 800-38F] Modes: AES KW, KWP Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits (provides between 128 and 256 bits of strength)	4015 (AES)
	[SP 800-38F] Mode: Triple-DES TKW Key size: 3-key (provides 112 bits of strength)	2199 (Triple-DES)

<sup>4</sup> In approved mode of operation, the use of this curve for anything other than signature verification is non-compliant.

<sup>5</sup> Internal IV generation with an approved DRBG as outlined in Section 8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D, see section 8.2 concerning external IVs. IV generation is compliant with IG A.5.

<sup>6</sup> EC Cofactor Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength). Keys are not directly established into the module using EC Cofactor Diffie-Hellman.

<sup>7</sup> These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

<sup>8</sup> Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
RSA	[FIPS 186-4, FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.31-1998 and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PSS and PKCS1.5)] Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification, RSADP Component Test Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits (1024, 1536, 4096 only for SigVer)	2059, 838 (CVL)
SHA	[FIPS 180-4], Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256	3312
SHA-3, SHAKE	[FIPS 202] SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, SHAKE256	5
Triple-DES (Triple-DES)	[SP 800-67] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB64, CFB8, TOFB, CTR Key sizes: 2-key <sup>9</sup> , 3-key	2199

**Table 5 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation**

Algorithm	Description	IG Ref.
KAS using <u>SHA-512/224</u> or <u>SHA-512/256</u>	[SP 800-56A-rev2] without key confirmation. Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE <sup>10</sup> Keys are not established directly into the module using ECCDH.	Vendor Affirmed IG A.3
KAS Components using <u>SHA-512/224</u> or <u>SHA-512/256</u>	[All of SP 800-56A-rev2 EXCEPT KDF Component] Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE <sup>11</sup> Keys are not established directly into the module using ECCDH.	Vendor Affirmed IG A.3
KAS Component ECCDH Primitive	[All of SP 800-56A-rev2 EXCEPT KDF Component] Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE Keys are not established directly into the module using ECCDH.	Vendor Affirmed IG D.1

<sup>9</sup> 2<sup>20</sup> block limit is enforced by the module, encryption disabled.

<sup>10</sup> Note: HMAC SHA-512/224 must not be used with parameter set EE.

<sup>11</sup> Note: HMAC SHA-512/224 must not be used with parameter set EE.

Algorithm	Description	IG Ref.
KDF, Password-Based	[SP 800-132] Options: PBKDF with Option 1a only. Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	Vendor Affirmed IG D.6
Key Transport Using RSA	[SP 800-56B] without key confirmation. Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits Keys are not directly established into the module using RSA.	Vendor Affirmed IG D.4

**Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions**

Algorithm	Description
Non-SP 800-56A-rev2 compliant ECCDH <sup>12</sup>	[IG D.8] Scenario 6 – non-Approved (not compliant with SP 800-56A) Primitive only, a partial ECCDH Key agreement scheme is allowed in an Approved FIPS Mode of operation. Parameter sets/Key sizes: EB, EC, ED, EE Keys are not established into the module using ECCDH.
Non-SP 800-56B compliant RSA <sup>13</sup> Key Transport	[IG D.9] RSA May be used by a calling application as part of a key encapsulation scheme. Key sizes: 2048 and 3072 bits Keys are not established into the module using RSA.
MD5 within TLS	[IG D.2]

**Table 7 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only.**

## 2.1

AES (non-compliant)	OpenSSL PBKDF
ARC4 (RC4)	PKCS#12 PBKDF
Camellia	Poly1305
ChaCha	RSA (non-compliant)
DSA (non-compliant)	SEED
ECDSA (non-compliant)	Serpent

<sup>12</sup> EC Cofactor Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength).

<sup>13</sup> RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength).

EIGamal	SPHINCS-256
NewHope	EC Diffie-Hellman (non-compliant)

## 2.2 Critical Security Parameters

All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section in Table 8. All usage of these CSPs by the Module (including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 3.2.

**Table 8 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)**

CSP	Description / Usage
AES Encryption Key	[FIPS-197, SP 800-56C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A (Oct 2010) ] AES (128/192/256) encrypt key <sup>14</sup>
AES Decryption Key	[FIPS-197, SP 800-56C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A (Oct 2010)] AES (128/192/256) decrypt key
AES Authentication Key	[FIPS-197] AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key
AES Wrapping Key	[SP 800-38F] AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
DRBG(CTR AES)	V (128 bits) and AES key (128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
DRBG(CTR Triple-DES)	V (64 bits) and Triple-DES key (192 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
DRBG(Hash)	V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
DRBG(HMAC)	V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
DSA Signing Key	[FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072 bits) signature generation key
EC Agreement Key	[SP 800-56A-rev2] EC (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) private key agreement key
EC Signing Key	[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves >= 224 bits) signature generation key.
HMAC Authentication Key	[FIPS 198-1] Keyed-Hash key (SHA-1, SHA-2). Key size determined by security strength required (>= 112 bits).

<sup>14</sup> The AES-GCM key is generated randomly per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is also generated randomly and at least 96 bits. In the event of power loss the AES-GCM key will be lost and the consuming application must ensure that new AES-GCM keys for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.

CSP	Description / Usage
RSA Signing Key	[FIPS 186-4] RSA (2048/3072 bits) signature generation key
RSA Key Transport Key	[SP 800-56B] RSA (2048/3072 bits) key transport (decryption) key
TLS KDF Secret Value	[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified TLS PRF.
Triple-DES Authentication Key	[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192 bits) CMAC key
Triple-DES Encryption Key	[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (192 bits) encryption key
Triple-DES Decryption Key	[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192 bits) decryption key
Triple-DES Wrapping Key	[SP 800-38F] Triple-DES (192 bits) key wrapping/unwrapping key, (128 unwrapping only).
X9.63 KDF Secret Value	[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of input for the specified X9.63 PRF.
SP 800-56A-rev2 Concatenation Derivation Function	[SP 800-56A-rev2] Secret value used in construction of key for underlying PRF.

## 2.3 Public Keys

Table 9 – Public Keys

CSP	Description / Usage
DSA Verification Key	[FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
EC Agreement Key	[SP 800-56-rev2] EC (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) public key agreement key
EC Verification Key	[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) signature verification key
RSA Key Transport Key	[SP 800-56B] RSA (2048/3072) key transport (encryption) key.
RSA Verification Key	[FIPS 186-4] RSA (1024/1536/2048/3072) signature verification key

### 3 Roles, Authentication and Services

#### 3.1 Assumption of Roles

The module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). The cryptographic module implicitly maps the two roles to the services. A user is considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the Module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.

Table 10 lists all operator roles supported by the Module. The Module does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The Module leverages the CLR to allow multiple threads (concurrent operations), and the operating system and CLR manage separate memory for each thread. In addition, there is high level thread management implemented by the module. The module does not support authentication.

**Table 10 – Roles Description**

Role ID	Role Description	Authentication Type
CO	Cryptographic Officer – Initialize the module.	N/A – Authentication not required for Level 1
User	User – use of the complete API.	N/A – Authentication not required for Level 1

#### 3.2 Services

All services implemented by the module are listed in Table 11 and Table 12 below. Each service description also describes all usage of CSPs by the service.

Table 11 lists the services. The second column provides a description of each service and availability to the Cryptographic Officer and User, in columns 3 and 4, respectively. All services available to the User are also available to the Cryptographic Officer. Only one role may be active at a time and the module does not allow concurrent operators, although an operator may perform more than one task concurrently.

Authentication of the Cryptographic Officer and/or User is not supported by the module but is a task performed by the host environment.

Table 11 – Services

Service	Description	C O	U
Initialize Module and Run Self-Tests on Demand	The CLR will call the static constructor for self-tests on module initialization.	X	
Show Status	A user can call <i>CryptoStatus.IsReady()</i> at any time to determine if the module is ready. <i>IsInApprovedOnlyMode()</i> can be called to determine the FIPS mode of operation.		X
Zeroize / Power-off	The module uses the CLR garbage collector on thread termination when objects are reclaimed.		X
Data Encryption	Used to encrypt data.		X
Data Decryption	Used to decrypt data.		X
MAC Calculation	Used to calculate data integrity codes with CMAC.		X
Signature Authentication	Used to generate signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA).		X
Signature Verification	Used to verify digital signatures.		X
DRBG (SP800-90A) output	Used for random number and IV generation.		X
Key Generation – Based on DRBG (SP800-90A)	Used for key generation.		X
Message Hashing	Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 message digest, SHAKE output.		X
Keyed Message Hashing	Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC.		X
TLS Key Derivation Function	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a master secret in TLS from a pre-master secret and additional input.		X
X9.63 Derivation Function	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a secret key from a input secret and additional input.		X
SP 800-56A-rev2 Concatenation Derivation Function	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a secret key from a input secret and additional input.		X
Password-Based Key Derivation Function	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to generate a key using an encoding of a password and an additional function such as a message hash.		X



Service	Description	C O	U
Key Agreement Schemes	Used to calculate key agreement values (SP 800-56A-rev2).		X
Key Wrapping	Used to encrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES)		X
Key Unwrapping	Used to decrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES)		X
NDRNG Callback	Gathers entropy in a passive manner from a user-provided function		X
Utility	Miscellaneous utility functions, does not access CSPs		X

Services in the module are accessed via the public APIs of the DLL. The ability of a thread to invoke unapproved services depends on whether it has been registered with the module as approved mode only. In approved only mode no unapproved services are accessible.

Table 12 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:

- G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
- R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the uses the CSP.
- E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
- W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
- Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.

Table 12 – CSP Access Rights within Services

Service	CSPs								
	AES Keys	EC CDH Keys	DRBG Keys	DSA Keys	ECDSA Keys	HMAC Keys	KDF Secret Values	RSA Keys	Triple-DES Keys
Initialize Module and Run Self-Tests on Demand									
Show Status									
Zeroize/Power Off	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z		Z	Z
Data Encryption	R								R
Data Decryption	R								R
MAC Calculation	R								R
Signature Calculation				R	R			R	
Signature Verification				R	R			R	
DRBG (SP800-90A) Output			R						
Key Generation – Based on DRBG (SP800-90A)	G	G	G	G	G	G		G	G
Message Hashing									
Keyed Message Hashing						R			
TLS Key Derivation Function							R		
X9.63 Derivation Function							R		
SP 800-56A-rev2 Concatenation Derivation Function							R		
Password-Based Key Derivation Function						G,R			
Key Agreement Schemes		R							
Key Wrapping (RSA, AES, Triple-DES)	R					R		R	R
Key Unwrapping (RSA, AES, Triple-DES)	R					R		R	R
NDRNG Callback			G						
Utility									

**4**

Note: keys are not established directly into the module using derivation functions or unwrapping schemes.

**5 Self-tests**

Each time the Module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module.

On power-up or reset, the Module performs the self-tests that are described in Table 13 below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module enters the Self-Test Failure error state. The module will output a detailed error message when *CryptoStatus.IsReady()* is called. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module and calling *CryptoStatus.IsReady()* again to confirm successful completion of the KATs.

**Table 13 – Power Up Self-tests**

Test Target	Description
Software Integrity	HMAC-SHA512
AES	KATs: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB Key sizes: 128 bits
AES-CMAC	KATs: Generation, Verification Key sizes: AES with 128 bits
CCM	KATs: Generation, Verification Key sizes: 128 bits
SP 800-56A-rev2 Primitive Z	KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation EC Curve: P-256
DRBG	KATs: HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA	KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA	KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification Curves/Key sizes: P-256
GCM/GMAC	KATs: Generation, Verification Key sizes: 128 bits
HMAC	KATs: Generation, Verification SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
KAS	KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation and KDF Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EB
RSA	KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHS	KATs: Output Verification SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Triple-DES	KATs: Encryption, Decryption Modes: TECP, Key sizes: 3-Key
Triple-DES-	KATs: Generation, Verification

Test Target	Description
CMAC	Key sizes: 3-Key
Extendable-Output functions (XOF)	KATs: Output Verification XOFs:SHAKE128, SHAKE256
KDF, Existing Application-Specific	MD5 KAT performed to verify operation of MD5 digest used in TLS 1.0 KDF.
KDF, Password-Based	KATs: None during SP 800-132 vendor affirmation period per IG D.6
Key Transport Using RSA	KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4 Key sizes: 2048 bits

**Table 14 – Conditional Self-tests**

Test Target	Description
NDRNG	NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG.
DRBG	DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG (on approved and unapproved DRBG).
DSA	DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key pair generation.
ECDSA	ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every EC key pair generation.
RSA	RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
DRBG Health Checks	Performed conditionally on approved and unapproved DRBG, per SP 800-90A Section 11.3.
SP 800-56A Assurances	Performed conditionally per SP 800-56A-rev2 Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and/or 5.6.3. Required per IG 9.6.

## 6 Physical Security Policy

The module is a software-only module and does not have physical security mechanisms.

## 7 Operational Environment

The Module is as a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.

The Module runs on a GPC running one of the operating systems specified in the approved operational environment list. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a logically separated manner. The Module's user is considered the calling application that instantiates the Module within the process space of the CLR. When the Module is not otherwise configured, it will start by default in the non-FIPS-approved mode.

### **7.1 Use of External RNG**

The module makes use of the .NET class RNGCryptoServiceProvider to provide entropy when required. The module will request entropy as appropriate to the security strength and seeding configuration for the DRBG that is using it. In approved mode the minimum amount of entropy that would be requested is 112 bits with a larger minimum being set if the security strength of the operation requires it. The module will wait until the RNGCryptoServiceProvider returns the requested amount of entropy.

## **8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy**

The Module implements basic protections to mitigate against timing based attacks against its internal implementations. There are two counter-measures used.

The first is Constant Time Comparisons, which protect the digest and integrity algorithms by strictly avoiding "fast fail" comparison of MACs, signatures, and digests so the time taken to compare a MAC, signature, or digest is constant regardless of whether the comparison passes or fails.

The second is made up of Numeric Blinding and decryption/signing verification which both protect the RSA algorithm.

Numeric Blinding prevents timing attacks against RSA decryption and signing by providing a random input into the operation which is subsequently eliminated when the result is produced. The random input makes it impossible for a third party observing the private key operation to attempt a timing attack on the operation as they do not have knowledge of the random input and consequently the time taken for the operation tells them nothing about the private value of the RSA key.

Decryption/signing verification is carried out by calculating a primitive encryption or signature verification operation after a corresponding decryption or signing operation before the result of the decryption or signing operation is returned. The purpose of this is to protect against Lenstra's CRT attack by verifying the correctness the private key calculations involved. Lenstra's CRT attack takes advantage of undetected errors in the use of RSA private keys with CRT values and, if exploitable, can be used to discover the private value of the RSA key.

## **9 Security Rules and Guidance**

### **9.1 Basic Enforcement**

The module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module.

1. The module shall provide two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The module does not provide authentication.
3. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
9. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
10. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs from the module's physical boundary.
11. The module does not output intermediate key values.

## **9.2 Basic Guidance**

Functionality in the module is provided via distinct classes that provide access to the FIPS approved and non-FIPS approved services provided by the module.

When the module is being used in FIPS approved-only mode, classes providing implementations of algorithms which are not FIPS approved, or allowed, are explicitly disabled.

## **9.3 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs**

IVs for GCM can be generated randomly, where an IV is not generated randomly the module supports the importing of GCM IVs.

In approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated randomly, the module enforces the use of an approved DRBG in line with Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D.

In approved mode, users of the module must not use GCM with an externally generated IV unless the source of the IV is also FIPS approved for GCM IV generation.

Per IG A.5, section 2.1 of this security policy also states that in the event module power is lost and restored the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.

## 9.4 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF

In line with the requirements for SP 800-132, keys generated using the approved PBKDF must only be used for storage applications. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non-compliant.

In approved mode the module enforces that any password used must encode to at least 14 bytes (112 bits) and that the salt is at least 16 bytes (128 bits) long. The iteration count associated with the PBKDF should be as large as practical.

As the module is a general purpose software module, it is not possible to anticipate all the levels of use for the PBKDF, however a user of the module should also note that a password should at least contain enough entropy to be unguessable and also contain enough entropy to reflect the security strength required for the key being generated. In the event a password encoding is simply based on ASCII a 14 byte password is unlikely to contain sufficient entropy for most purposes. Users are referred to Appendix A, "Security Considerations" of SP 800-132 for further information on password, salt, and iteration count selection.

## 10 References and Definitions

The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.

**Table 15 – References**

Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31	<i>X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998</i>
FIPS 140-2	<i>Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25 2001</i>
FIPS 180-4	<i>Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</i>
FIPS 186-3	<i>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</i>
FIPS 186-4	<i>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</i>
FIPS 197	<i>Advanced Encryption Standard</i>
FIPS 198-1	<i>The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)</i>
FIPS 202	<i>SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions</i>
IG	<i>Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, January 11, 2016.</i>
PKCS#1 v2.1	<i>RSA Cryptography Standard</i>
PKCS#5	<i>Password-Based Cryptography Standard</i>
SP 800-38A	<i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode</i>

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Full Specification Name</b>
SP 800-38B	<i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication</i>
SP 800-38C	<i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality</i>
SP 800-38D	<i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC</i>
SP 800-38F	<i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping</i>
SP 800-56A-rev2	<i>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography Revision 2.</i>
SP 800-56B	<i>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography</i>
SP 800-56C	<i>Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion</i>
SP 800-67	<i>Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher</i>
SP 800-89	<i>Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications</i>
SP 800-90A	<i>Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators</i>
SP 800-132	<i>Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation</i>
SP 800-135	<i>Recommendation for Existing Application –Specific Key Derivation Functions</i>

**Table 16 – Acronyms and Definitions**

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Definition</b>
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
BC	Bouncy Castle
BC-FNA	Bouncy Castle FIPS .NET API
CBC	Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with CBC-MAC
CDH	Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB	Cipher Feedback Mode
CLR	Common Language Runtime
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP	Crypto Module Validation Program
CO	Cryptographic Officer
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CS	Ciphertext Stealing
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter-mode
CVL	Component Validation List



Acronym	Definition
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DLL	Dynamic Link Library
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Authority
EC	Elliptic Curve
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Authority
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FCL	Framework Class Library
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC	Galois Message Authentication Code
GPC	General Purpose Computer
HMAC	key-Hashed Message Authentication Code
IG	See References
IV	Initialization Vector
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
KAT	Known Answer Test
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KW	Key Wrap
KWP	Key Wrap with Padding
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD5	Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A	Non Applicable
NDRNG	Non Deterministic Random Number Generator
OCB	Offset Codebook Mode
OFB	Output Feedback
OS	Operating System
PBKDF	Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards
PRF	Pseudorandom Function
PQG	Diffie-Hellman Parameters P, Q and G
RC	Rivest Cipher, Ron's Code
RIPEND	RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm

Acronym	Definition
TCBC	TDEA Cipher-Block Chaining
TCFB	TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode
TDEA	Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
TECB	TDEA Electronic Codebook
TOFB	TDEA Output Feedback
TLS	Transport Layer Security
USB	Universal Serial Bus
XOF	Extendable-Output Function