Package org.bouncycastle.tls

Class AlertDescription

java.lang.Object

org.bouncycastle.tls.AlertDescription

public class AlertDescription
extends Object

RFC 5246 7.2.

Field Summary

Fields

Modifier and Type	Field	Description
static final short	access_denied	A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.
static final short	bad_certificate	A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc.
static final short	bad_certificate_hash_value	This alert is sent by servers when a certificate hash does not match a client provided certificate_hash.
static final short	bad_certificate_status_response	This alert is sent by clients that receive an invalid certificate status response (see Section 3.6).
static final short	bad_record_mac	This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC.
static final short	certificate_expired	A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
static final short	certificate_required	Sent by servers when a client certificate is desired but none was provided by the client.
static final short	certificate_revoked	A certificate was revoked by its signer.
static final short	certificate_unknown	Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
static final short	certificate_unobtainable	This alert is sent by servers who are unable to retrieve a certificate chain from the URL supplied by the client (see Section 3.3).
static final short	close_notify	This message notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection.
static final short	decode_error	A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the length of the message was incorrect.
static final short	decompression_failure	The decompression function received improper input (e.g., data that would expand to excessive length).
static final short	decrypt_error	A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a signature or validate a Finished message.
static final short	decryption_failed	This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS, and may have permitted certain attacks against the CBC mode [CBCATT].
static final short	export_restriction	This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS.
static final short	handshake_failure	Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available.
static final short	illegal_parameter	A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields.
static final short	inappropriate_fallback	If TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV appears in ClientHello.cipher_suites and the highest protocol version supported by the server is higher than the version indicated in ClientHello.client_version, the server MUST respond with a fatal inappropriate_fallback alert [..].
static final short	insufficient_security	Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client.
static final short	internal_error	An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol (such as a memory allocation failure) makes it impossible to continue.
static final short	missing_extension	Sent by endpoints that receive a handshake message not containing an extension that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version or other negotiated parameters.
static final short	no_application_protocol	In the event that the server supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
static final short	no_certificate	This alert was used in SSLv3 but not any version of TLS.
static final short	no_renegotiation	Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking.
static final short	protocol_version	The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported.
static final short	record_overflow	A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes.
static final short	unexpected_message	An inappropriate message was received.
static final short	unknown_ca	A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA.
static final short	unknown_psk_identity	If the server does not recognize the PSK identity, it MAY respond with an "unknown_psk_identity" alert message.
static final short	unrecognized_name	This alert is sent by servers that receive a server_name extension request, but do not recognize the server name.
static final short	unsupported_certificate	A certificate was of an unsupported type.
static final short	unsupported_extension	Sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing an extension that they did not put in the corresponding client hello.
static final short	user_canceled	This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure.

Constructor Summary

Constructors

Constructor	Description
AlertDescription()

Method Summary

Modifier and Type	Method	Description
static String	getName(short alertDescription)
static String	getText(short alertDescription)

Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object

clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait, wait

Field Details

close_notify

public static final short close_notify

This message notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection. Note that as of TLS 1.1, failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 ("The session becomes unresumable if any connection is terminated without proper close_notify messages with level equal to warning.") to conform with widespread implementation practice.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

unexpected_message

public static final short unexpected_message

An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

bad_record_mac

public static final short bad_record_mac

This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This alert also MUST be returned if an alert is sent because a TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an even multiple of the block length, or its padding values, when checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network).

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

decryption_failed

public static final short decryption_failed

This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS, and may have permitted certain attacks against the CBC mode [CBCATT]. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant implementations.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

record_overflow

public static final short record_overflow

A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network).

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

decompression_failure

public static final short decompression_failure

The decompression function received improper input (e.g., data that would expand to excessive length). This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

handshake_failure

public static final short handshake_failure

Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

no_certificate

public static final short no_certificate

This alert was used in SSLv3 but not any version of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant implementations.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

bad_certificate

public static final short bad_certificate

A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

unsupported_certificate

public static final short unsupported_certificate

A certificate was of an unsupported type.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

certificate_revoked

public static final short certificate_revoked

A certificate was revoked by its signer.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

certificate_expired

public static final short certificate_expired

A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

certificate_unknown

public static final short certificate_unknown

Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

illegal_parameter

public static final short illegal_parameter

A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

unknown_ca

public static final short unknown_ca

A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

access_denied

public static final short access_denied

A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

decode_error

public static final short decode_error

A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network).

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

decrypt_error

public static final short decrypt_error

A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a signature or validate a Finished message. This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

export_restriction

public static final short export_restriction

This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant implementations.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

protocol_version

public static final short protocol_version

The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported. (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons.) This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

insufficient_security

public static final short insufficient_security

Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

internal_error

public static final short internal_error

An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol (such as a memory allocation failure) makes it impossible to continue. This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

user_canceled

public static final short user_canceled

This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close_notify. This message is generally a warning.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

no_renegotiation

public static final short no_renegotiation

Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert. At that point, the original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this would be appropriate is where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup, and it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This message is always a warning.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

unsupported_extension

public static final short unsupported_extension

Sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing an extension that they did not put in the corresponding client hello. This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

certificate_unobtainable

public static final short certificate_unobtainable

This alert is sent by servers who are unable to retrieve a certificate chain from the URL supplied by the client (see Section 3.3). This message MAY be fatal - for example if client authentication is required by the server for the handshake to continue and the server is unable to retrieve the certificate chain, it may send a fatal alert.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

unrecognized_name

public static final short unrecognized_name

This alert is sent by servers that receive a server_name extension request, but do not recognize the server name. This message MAY be fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

bad_certificate_status_response

public static final short bad_certificate_status_response

This alert is sent by clients that receive an invalid certificate status response (see Section 3.6). This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

bad_certificate_hash_value

public static final short bad_certificate_hash_value

This alert is sent by servers when a certificate hash does not match a client provided certificate_hash. This message is always fatal.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

unknown_psk_identity

public static final short unknown_psk_identity

If the server does not recognize the PSK identity, it MAY respond with an "unknown_psk_identity" alert message.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

no_application_protocol

public static final short no_application_protocol

In the event that the server supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

inappropriate_fallback

public static final short inappropriate_fallback

If TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV appears in ClientHello.cipher_suites and the highest protocol version supported by the server is higher than the version indicated in ClientHello.client_version, the server MUST respond with a fatal inappropriate_fallback alert [..].

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

missing_extension

public static final short missing_extension

Sent by endpoints that receive a handshake message not containing an extension that is mandatory to send for the offered TLS version or other negotiated parameters.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

certificate_required

public static final short certificate_required

Sent by servers when a client certificate is desired but none was provided by the client.

See Also:

• Constant Field Values

Constructor Details

AlertDescription

public AlertDescription()

Method Details

getName

public static String getName(short alertDescription)

getText

public static String getText(short alertDescription)