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Bouncy Castle Cryptography Library 1.81 | |||||||||
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java.lang.Objectorg.bouncycastle.crypto.agreement.ecjpake.ECJPAKEParticipant
A participant in a Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE) exchange.
The J-PAKE exchange is defined by Feng Hao and Peter Ryan in the paper "J-PAKE: Authenticated Key Exchange Without PKI."
The J-PAKE protocol is symmetric.
There is no notion of a client or server, but rather just two participants.
An instance of ECJPAKEParticipant
represents one participant, and
is the primary interface for executing the exchange.
To execute an exchange, construct a ECJPAKEParticipant
on each end,
and call the following 7 methods
(once and only once, in the given order, for each participant, sending messages between them as described):
createRound1PayloadToSend()
- and send the payload to the other participant
validateRound1PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound1Payload)
- use the payload received from the other participant
createRound2PayloadToSend()
- and send the payload to the other participant
validateRound2PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound2Payload)
- use the payload received from the other participant
calculateKeyingMaterial()
createRound3PayloadToSend(BigInteger)
- and send the payload to the other participant
validateRound3PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound3Payload, BigInteger)
- use the payload received from the other participant
Each side should derive a session key from the keying material returned by calculateKeyingMaterial()
.
The caller is responsible for deriving the session key using a secure key derivation function (KDF).
Round 3 is an optional key confirmation process. If you do not execute round 3, then there is no assurance that both participants are using the same key. (i.e. if the participants used different passwords, then their session keys will differ.)
If the round 3 validation succeeds, then the keys are guaranteed to be the same on both sides.
The symmetric design can easily support the asymmetric cases when one party initiates the communication. e.g. Sometimes the round1 payload and round2 payload may be sent in one pass. Also, in some cases, the key confirmation payload can be sent together with the round2 payload. These are the trivial techniques to optimize the communication.
The key confirmation process is implemented as specified in NIST SP 800-56A Revision 3, Section 5.9.1 Unilateral Key Confirmation for Key Agreement Schemes.
This class is stateful and NOT threadsafe.
Each instance should only be used for ONE complete J-PAKE exchange
(i.e. a new ECJPAKEParticipant
should be constructed for each new J-PAKE exchange).
Field Summary | |
static int |
STATE_INITIALIZED
|
static int |
STATE_KEY_CALCULATED
|
static int |
STATE_ROUND_1_CREATED
|
static int |
STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED
|
static int |
STATE_ROUND_2_CREATED
|
static int |
STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED
|
static int |
STATE_ROUND_3_CREATED
|
static int |
STATE_ROUND_3_VALIDATED
|
Constructor Summary | |
ECJPAKEParticipant(java.lang.String participantId,
char[] password)
Convenience constructor for a new ECJPAKEParticipant that uses
the ECJPAKECurves.NIST_P256 elliptic curve,
a SHA-256 digest, and a default SecureRandom implementation.
|
|
ECJPAKEParticipant(java.lang.String participantId,
char[] password,
ECJPAKECurve curve)
Convenience constructor for a new ECJPAKEParticipant that uses
a SHA-256 digest and a default SecureRandom implementation.
|
|
ECJPAKEParticipant(java.lang.String participantId,
char[] password,
ECJPAKECurve curve,
Digest digest,
java.security.SecureRandom random)
Construct a new ECJPAKEParticipant .
|
Method Summary | |
java.math.BigInteger |
calculateKeyingMaterial()
Calculates and returns the key material. |
ECJPAKERound1Payload |
createRound1PayloadToSend()
Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 1. |
ECJPAKERound2Payload |
createRound2PayloadToSend()
Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 2. |
ECJPAKERound3Payload |
createRound3PayloadToSend(java.math.BigInteger keyingMaterial)
Creates and returns the payload to send to the other participant during round 3. |
int |
getState()
Gets the current state of this participant. |
void |
validateRound1PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound1Payload round1PayloadReceived)
Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 1. |
void |
validateRound2PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound2Payload round2PayloadReceived)
Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 2. |
void |
validateRound3PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound3Payload round3PayloadReceived,
java.math.BigInteger keyingMaterial)
Validates the payload received from the other participant during round 3. |
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object |
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait, wait |
Field Detail |
public static final int STATE_INITIALIZED
public static final int STATE_ROUND_1_CREATED
public static final int STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED
public static final int STATE_ROUND_2_CREATED
public static final int STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED
public static final int STATE_KEY_CALCULATED
public static final int STATE_ROUND_3_CREATED
public static final int STATE_ROUND_3_VALIDATED
Constructor Detail |
public ECJPAKEParticipant(java.lang.String participantId, char[] password)
ECJPAKEParticipant
that uses
the ECJPAKECurves.NIST_P256
elliptic curve,
a SHA-256 digest, and a default SecureRandom
implementation.
After construction, the state
will be STATE_INITIALIZED
.
participantId
- unique identifier of this participant.
The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id.password
- shared secret.
A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once calculateKeyingMaterial()
is called).
Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible.
java.lang.NullPointerException
- if any argument is null
java.lang.IllegalArgumentException
- if password is emptypublic ECJPAKEParticipant(java.lang.String participantId, char[] password, ECJPAKECurve curve)
ECJPAKEParticipant
that uses
a SHA-256 digest and a default SecureRandom
implementation.
After construction, the state
will be STATE_INITIALIZED
.
participantId
- unique identifier of this participant.
The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id.password
- shared secret.
A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once calculateKeyingMaterial()
is called).
Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible.curve
- elliptic curve
See ECJPAKECurves
for standard curves.
java.lang.NullPointerException
- if any argument is null
java.lang.IllegalArgumentException
- if password is emptypublic ECJPAKEParticipant(java.lang.String participantId, char[] password, ECJPAKECurve curve, Digest digest, java.security.SecureRandom random)
ECJPAKEParticipant
.
After construction, the state
will be STATE_INITIALIZED
.
participantId
- unique identifier of this participant.
The two participants in the exchange must NOT share the same id.password
- shared secret.
A defensive copy of this array is made (and cleared once calculateKeyingMaterial()
is called).
Caller should clear the input password as soon as possible.curve
- elliptic curve.
See ECJPAKECurves
for standard curvesdigest
- digest to use during zero knowledge proofs and key confirmation (SHA-256 or stronger preferred)random
- source of secure random data for x1 and x2, and for the zero knowledge proofs
java.lang.NullPointerException
- if any argument is null
java.lang.IllegalArgumentException
- if password is emptyMethod Detail |
public int getState()
public ECJPAKERound1Payload createRound1PayloadToSend()
After execution, the state
will be STATE_ROUND_1_CREATED
.
public void validateRound1PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound1Payload round1PayloadReceived) throws CryptoException
Must be called prior to createRound2PayloadToSend()
.
After execution, the state
will be STATE_ROUND_1_VALIDATED
.
CryptoException
- if validation fails.
java.lang.IllegalStateException
- if called multiple times.public ECJPAKERound2Payload createRound2PayloadToSend()
validateRound1PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound1Payload)
must be called prior to this method.
After execution, the state
will be STATE_ROUND_2_CREATED
.
java.lang.IllegalStateException
- if called prior to validateRound1PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound1Payload)
, or multiple timespublic void validateRound2PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound2Payload round2PayloadReceived) throws CryptoException
Note that this DOES NOT detect a non-common password. The only indication of a non-common password is through derivation of different keys (which can be detected explicitly by executing round 3 and round 4)
Must be called prior to calculateKeyingMaterial()
.
After execution, the state
will be STATE_ROUND_2_VALIDATED
.
CryptoException
- if validation fails.
java.lang.IllegalStateException
- if called prior to validateRound1PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound1Payload)
, or multiple timespublic java.math.BigInteger calculateKeyingMaterial()
ECJPAKEParticipant
).
The keying material will be identical for each participant if and only if
each participant's password is the same. i.e. If the participants do not
share the same password, then each participant will derive a different key.
Therefore, if you immediately start using a key derived from
the keying material, then you must handle detection of incorrect keys.
If you want to handle this detection explicitly, you can optionally perform
rounds 3 and 4. See ECJPAKEParticipant
for details on how to execute
rounds 3 and 4.
The keying material will be in the range [0, n-1].
validateRound2PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound2Payload)
must be called prior to this method.
As a side effect, the internal #password
array is cleared, since it is no longer needed.
After execution, the state
will be STATE_KEY_CALCULATED
.
java.lang.IllegalStateException
- if called prior to validateRound2PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound2Payload)
,
or if called multiple times.public ECJPAKERound3Payload createRound3PayloadToSend(java.math.BigInteger keyingMaterial)
See ECJPAKEParticipant
for more details on round 3.
After execution, the state
will be STATE_ROUND_3_CREATED
.
keyingMaterial
- The keying material as returned from calculateKeyingMaterial()
.
java.lang.IllegalStateException
- if called prior to calculateKeyingMaterial()
, or multiple timespublic void validateRound3PayloadReceived(ECJPAKERound3Payload round3PayloadReceived, java.math.BigInteger keyingMaterial) throws CryptoException
See ECJPAKEParticipant
for more details on round 3.
After execution, the state
will be STATE_ROUND_3_VALIDATED
.
round3PayloadReceived
- The round 3 payload received from the other participant.keyingMaterial
- The keying material as returned from calculateKeyingMaterial()
.
CryptoException
- if validation fails.
java.lang.IllegalStateException
- if called prior to calculateKeyingMaterial()
, or multiple times
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Bouncy Castle Cryptography Library 1.81 | |||||||||
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SUMMARY: NESTED | FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD | DETAIL: FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD |